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In this paper, we exploit a new multi-country 
historical dataset on public (government) debt to 
search for a systemic relationship between high 
public  debt  levels,  growth  and  inflation.
1  Our 
main  result  is  that  whereas  the  link  between 
growth and debt seems relatively weak at “nor-
mal” debt levels, median growth rates for coun-
tries with public debt over roughly 90 percent 
of GDP are about one percent lower than other-
wise; average (mean) growth rates are several 
percent  lower.  Surprisingly,  the  relationship 
between public debt and growth is remarkably 
similar across emerging markets and advanced 
economies. This is not the case for inflation. We 
find  no  systematic  relationship  between  high 
debt  levels  and  inflation  for  advanced  econo-
mies as a group (albeit with individual country 
exceptions including the United States). By con-
trast, in emerging market countries, high public 
debt levels coincide with higher inflation.
Our  topic  would  seem  to  be  a  timely  one. 
Public debt has been soaring in the wake of the 
recent global financial maelstrom, especially in 
the epicenter countries. This should not be sur-
prising, given the experience of earlier severe 
financial crises.
2 Outsized deficits and epic bank 
bailouts may be useful in fighting a downturn, 
but what is the long-run macroeconomic impact, 
1  In  this  paper  “public  debt”  refers  to  gross  central 
government debt.  “Domestic public debt” is government 
debt issued under domestic legal jurisdiction. Public debt 
does not include debts carrying a government guarantee. 
Total gross external debt includes the external debts of all 
branches of government as well as private debt that is issued 
by domestic private entities under a foreign jurisdiction.
2 Reinhart and Rogoff (2009a, b) demonstrate that the 
aftermath  of  a  deep  financial  crisis  typically  involves  a 
protracted period of macroeconomic adjustment, particu-
larly in employment and housing prices. On average, public 
debt rose by more than 80 percent within three years after 
a crisis.
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especially against the backdrop of graying pop-
ulations and rising social insurance costs? Are 
sharply elevated public debts ultimately a man-
ageable policy challenge?
Our  approach  here  is  decidedly  empirical, 
taking  advantage  of  a  broad  new  historical 
dataset  on  public  debt  (in  particular,  central 
government debt) first presented in Carmen M. 
Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff (2008, 2009b). 
Prior to this dataset, it was exceedingly difficult 
to get more than two or three decades of pub-
lic debt data even for many rich countries, and 
virtually impossible for most emerging markets. 
Our  results  incorporate  data  on  44  countries 
spanning about 200 years. Taken together, the 
data incorporate over 3,700 annual observations 
covering a wide range of political systems, insti-
tutions,  exchange  rate  and  monetary  arrange-
ments, and historic circumstances.
We also employ more recent data on external 
debt, including debt owed both by governments 
and by private entities. For emerging markets, 
we  find  that  there  exists  a  significantly  more 
severe  threshold  for  total  gross  external  debt 
(public  and  private)—which  is  almost  exclu-
sively denominated in a foreign currency—than 
for  total  public  debt  (the  domestically  issued 
component  of  which  is  largely  denominated 
in home currency). When gross external debt 
reaches  60  percent  of  GDP,  annual  growth 
declines  by  about  two  percent;  for  levels  of 
external debt in excess of 90 percent of GDP, 
growth rates are roughly cut in half. We are not 
in a position to calculate separate total exter-
nal debt thresholds (as opposed to public debt 
thresholds) for advanced countries. The avail-
able time-series is too recent, beginning only in 
2000. We do note, however, that external debt 
levels in advanced countries now average nearly 
200 percent of GDP, with external debt levels 
being particularly high across Europe.
The focus of this paper is on the longer term 
macroeconomic  implications  of  much  higher 
public and external debt. The final section, how-
ever,  summarizes  the  historical  experience  of 
the United States in dealing with private sector 
* Reinhart:  Department  of  Economics,  4115  Tydings 
Hall,  University  of  Maryland,  College  Park,  MD  20742 
(e-mail: creinhar@umd.edu); Rogoff: Economics Depart-
ment, 216 Littauer Center, Harvard University, Cambridge 
MA  02138–3001  (e-mail:  krogoff@harvard.edu).  The 
authors would like to thank Olivier Jeanne and Vincent R. 
Reinhart for helpful comments.MAY 2010 574 AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS
deleveraging of debts, normal after a financial 
crisis. Not surprisingly, such episodes are asso-
ciated with very slow growth and deflation.
I.  The 2007–2009 Global Buildup in Public Debt
Figure 1 illustrates the increase in (inflation-
adjusted)  public  debt  that  has  occurred  since 
2007. For the five countries with systemic finan-
cial crises (Iceland, Ireland, Spain, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States), average debt 
levels are up by about 75 percent, well on track to 
reach or surpass the three year 86 percent bench-
mark that Reinhart and Rogoff (2009a,b), find 
for earlier deep postwar financial crises. Even in 
countries that did not experience a major finan-
cial crisis, debt rose by an average of about 20 
percent in real terms between 2007 and 2009.
3 
3 Our focus on gross central government debt owes to 
the fact that time series of broader measures of government 
This general rise in public   indebtedness stands in 
stark contrast to the 2003–2006 period of pub-
lic deleveraging in many countries and owes to 
direct bailout costs in some countries, the adop-
tion of stimulus packages to deal with the global 
recession in many countries, and marked declines 
in government revenues that have hit advanced 
and emerging market economies alike.
II.  Debt, Growth, and Inflation
The nonlinear effect of debt on growth is 
reminiscent  of  “debt  intolerance”  (Reinhart, 
Rogoff, and Miguel A. Savastano 2003) and 
presumably is related to a nonlinear response 
of market   interest rates as countries reach debt 
tolerance limits. Sharply rising interest rates, 
in turn, force painful fiscal adjustment in the 
form  of  tax  hikes  and  spending  cuts,  or,  in 
some cases, outright default. As for inflation, 
an obvious connection stems from the fact that 
unanticipated  high  inflation  can  reduce  the 
real cost of servicing the debt. Of course, the 
efficacy of the inflation channel is quite sen-
sitive to the maturity structure of the debt. In 
principle, the manner in which debt builds up 
can be important. For example, war debts are 
arguably  less  problematic  for  future  growth 
and  inflation  than  large  debts  that  are  accu-
mulated  in  peacetime.  Postwar  growth  tends 
to be high as wartime allocation of manpower 
and resources funnels to the civilian economy. 
Moreover, high wartime government spending, 
typically the cause of the debt buildup, comes 
to a natural close as peace returns. In contrast, 
a peacetime debt explosion often reflects unsta-
ble political economy dynamics that can persist 
for very long periods.
Here we will not attempt to determine the gen-
esis of debt buildups but instead simply look at 
their connection to average and median growth 
and inflation outcomes. This may lead us, if any-
thing, to understate the adverse growth implica-
tions of debt burdens arising out of the current 
crisis, which was clearly a peacetime event.
debt are not available for many countries. Of course, the 
true run-up in debt is significantly larger than stated here, 
at least on a present value actuarial basis, due to the exten-
sive government guarantees that have been conferred on the 
financial sector in the crisis countries and elsewhere, where 
for example deposit guarantees were raised in 2008. 
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Figure 1. Cumulative Increase in Real Public Debt 
Since 2007, Selected Countries
Note: Unless otherwise noted these figures are for central 
government debt deflated by consumer prices.
Sources:  Prices  and  nominal  GDP  from  International 
Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook. For a complete 
listing of sources for government debt, see Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2009b).VOL. 100 NO. 2 575 GROwth IN A tIME Of DEBt
A. Evidence from Advanced Countries
Figure 2 presents a summary of inflation and 
GDP growth across varying levels of debt for 20 
advanced countries over the period 1946–2009. 
This group includes Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada,  Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the 
United  Kingdom,  and  the  United  States.  The 
annual observations are grouped into four cat-
egories, according to the ratio of debt to GDP 
during that particular year as follows: years when 
debt to GDP levels were below 30 percent (low 
debt); years where debt/GDP was 30 to 60 per-
cent (medium debt); 60 to 90 percent (high); and 
above 90 percent (very high). The bars in Figure 
2  show  average  and  median  GDP  growth  for 
each of the four debt categories. Note that of the 
1,186 annual observations, there are a significant 
number in each category, including 96 above 90 
percent. (Recent observations in that top bracket 
come from Belgium, Greece, Italy, and Japan.) 
From  the  figure,  it  is  evident  that  there  is  no 
obvious link between debt and growth until pub-
lic debt reaches a threshold of 90 percent. The 
observations with debt to GDP over 90 percent 
have median growth roughly 1 percent lower than 
the lower debt burden groups and mean levels of 
growth  almost  4  percent  lower.  (Using  lagged 
debt does not dramatically change the picture.) 
The line in Figure 2 plots the median inflation for 
the different debt groupings—which makes plain 
that there is no apparent pattern of simultaneous 
rising inflation and debt.
Table 1 provides detail on the growth experi-
ence for individual countries, but over a much 
longer  period,  typically  one  to  two  centuries. 
Interestingly, introducing the longer time-series 
yields remarkably similar conclusions. Over the 
past two centuries, debt in excess of 90 percent 
has typically been associated with mean growth 
of 1.7 percent versus 3.7 percent when debt is 
low (under 30 percent of GDP), and compared 
with growth rates of over 3 percent for the two 
middle categories (debt between 30 and 90 per-
cent of GDP). Of course, there is considerable 
variation across the countries, with some coun-
tries such as Australia and New Zealand experi-
encing no growth deterioration at very high debt 
levels. It is noteworthy, however, that those high-
growth high-debt observations are clustered in 
the years following World War II.
B. Evidence from Emerging Market Countries
We  next  perform  the  same  exercise  for  24 
emerging  market  economies  for  the  periods 
1946–2009 and 1900–2009, using comparable 
central government debt data to those we used 
for the advanced economies.
4 Perhaps surpris-
ingly,  the  results  illustrated  in  Figure  2  and 
Table 1 for advanced economies are repeated 
for emerging market economies. The emerging   
4 While we have pre-1900 inflation, real GDP, and public 
debt data for many emerging markets, nominal GDP data is 
harder to find.
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Figure 2. Government Debt, Growth, and Inflation: 
Selected Advanced Economies, 1946–2009
Notes:  Central  government  debt  includes  domestic  and 
external public debts. The 20 advanced economies included 
are  Australia,  Austria,  Belgium,  Canada,  Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands,  New  Zealand,  Norway,  Portugal,  Spain, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The 
number of observations for the four debt groups are: 443 
for debt/GDP below 30 percent; 442 for debt/GDP 30 to 60 
percent; 199 observations for debt/GDP 60 to 90 percent; 
and 96 for debt/GDP above 90 percent. There are 1,180 
observations.
Sources: International Monetary Fund,  world Economic 
Outlook,  OECD,  World  Bank,  Global  Development 
finance,  and  Reinhart  and  Rogoff  (2009b)  and  sources 
cited therein.MAY 2010 576 AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS
market equivalents of Figure 2 and Table 1 are 
not reproduced here (to economize on space), 
but  the  interested  reader  is  referred  to  the 
NBER  working  paper  version  of  this  paper. 
For 1900–2009, for example, median and aver-
age GDP growth hovers around 4–4.5 percent 
for levels of debt below 90 percent of GDP, but 
median  growth  falls  markedly  to  2.9  percent 
for high debt (above 90 percent); the decline is 
even greater for the average growth rate, which 
falls to 1 percent. With much faster population 
growth than the advanced economies’, the impli-
cations for per capita GDP growth are in line (or 
worse) with those shown for advanced econo-
mies. The similarities with advanced economies 
end there, as higher debt levels are associated 
with significantly higher levels of inflation in 
emerging markets. Median inflation more than 
doubles (from less than seven percent to 16 per-
cent) as debt rises from the low (0 to 30 percent) 
range to above 90 percent. Fiscal dominance is a 
plausible interpretation of this pattern.
Because emerging markets often depend so 
much on external borrowing, it is interesting to 
look separately at thresholds for external debt 
(public and private). In Figure 3, we highlight 
the connection between gross external debt as 
reported  by  the  World  Bank  and  growth  and 
inflation. As one can see, the growth thresholds 
for external debt are considerably lower than the 
thresholds for total public debt. Growth dete-
riorates markedly at external debt levels over 
Table 1—Real GDP Growth as the Level of Government Debt Varies: 
Selected Advanced Economies, 1790–2009 
(annual percent change)
Central (federal) government debt/GDP
Country Period
Below 30 
percent
30 to 60 
percent
60 to 90 
percent
90 percent 
and above
Australia 1902–2009 3.1 4.1 2.3 4.6
Austria 1880–2009 4.3 3.0 2.3 n.a.
Belgium 1835–2009 3.0 2.6 2.1 3.3
Canada 1925–2009 2.0 4.5 3.0 2.2
Denmark 1880–2009 3.1 1.7 2.4 n.a.
Finland 1913–2009 3.2 3.0 4.3 1.9
France 1880–2009 4.9 2.7 2.8 2.3
Germany 1880–2009 3.6 0.9 n.a. n.a.
Greece 1884–2009 4.0 0.3 4.8 2.5
Ireland 1949–2009 4.4 4.5 4.0 2.4
Italy 1880–2009 5.4 4.9 1.9 0.7
Japan 1885–2009 4.9 3.7 3.9 0.7
Netherlands 1880–2009 4.0 2.8 2.4 2.0
New Zealand 1932–2009 2.5 2.9 3.9 3.6
Norway 1880–2009 2.9 4.4 n.a. n.a.
Portugal 1851–2009 4.8 2.5 1.4 n.a.
Spain 1850–2009 1.6 3.3 1.3 2.2
Sweden 1880–2009 2.9 2.9 2.7 n.a.
United Kingdom 1830–2009 2.5 2.2 2.1 1.8
United States 1790–2009 4.0 3.4 3.3 −1.8
Average 3.7 3.0 3.4 1.7
Median 3.9 3.1 2.8 1.9
Observations =         2,317 866 654 445 352
Notes: An n.a. denotes no observations were recorded for that particular debt range. There 
are missing observations, most notably during World War I and II years; further details are 
provided in the data appendices to Reinhart and Rogoff (2009b) and are available from the 
authors. Minimum and maximum values for each debt range are shown in bolded italics.
Sources: There are many sources; among the more prominent are: International Monetary 
Fund, world Economic Outlook, OECD, World Bank, Global Development finance. Extensive 
other sources are cited in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).VOL. 100 NO. 2 577 GROwth IN A tIME Of DEBt
60 percent, and further still when external debt 
levels exceed 90 percent, which record outright 
declines. In light of this, it is more understand-
able that over one half of all defaults on external 
debt in emerging markets since 1970 occurred at 
levels of debt that would have met the Maastricht 
criteria of 60 percent. Inflation becomes signifi-
cantly higher only for the group of observations 
with external debt over 90 percent.
III.  Private Sector Debt: An Illustration
Our main focus has been on central govern-
ment debt and, to a lesser degree, external public 
and private debt, since reliable data on private 
domestic debts are much scarcer across countries 
and time. We have argued here and elsewhere 
that  a  key  legacy  of  a  deep  financial  crisis  is 
rapidly expanding public debt. Furthermore, we 
have shown that public levels of debt/GDP that 
push the 90 percent threshold are associated with 
lower median and average growth.
5 These obser-
vations, however, present only a partial picture of 
the post-financial crisis landscape. Private debt, 
in contrast, tends to shrink sharply in the after-
math of a financial crisis. Just as a rapid expan-
sion in private credit fuels the boom phase of the 
cycle, so does serious deleveraging exacerbate the 
post-crisis downturn. This pattern is illustrated in 
Figure 4, which shows the ratio of private debt to 
GDP for the United States for 1916–2009. Periods 
of sharp deleveraging have followed periods of 
lower  growth  and  coincide  with  higher  unem-
ployment. In varying degrees, the private sector 
(households and firms) in many other countries 
(notably both advanced and emerging Europe) 
are also unwinding the debt built up during the 
boom year. Thus, private deleveraging may be 
another legacy of the financial crisis that may 
dampen growth in the medium term.
IV.  Concluding Remarks
The sharp run-up in public sector debt will 
likely  prove  one  of  the  most  enduring  lega-
cies  of  the  2007–2009  financial  crises  in  the 
United States and elsewhere. We examine the 
experience of 44 countries spanning up to two 
centuries of data on central government debt, 
inflation and growth. Our main finding is that 
across both advanced countries and emerging 
markets, high debt/GDP levels (90 percent and 
above) are associated with notably lower growth 
outcomes. Much lower levels of external debt/
GDP (60 percent) are associated with adverse 
outcomes for emerging market growth. Seldom 
do countries “grow” their way out of debts. The 
nonlinear response of growth to debt as debt 
grows  towards  historical  boundaries  is  remi-
niscent of the “debt intolerance” phenomenon 
developed in Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano 
(2003). As countries hit debt tolerance ceilings, 
market interest rates can begin to rise quite sud-
denly, forcing painful adjustment.
Of  course,  there  are  other  vulnerabilities 
associated  with  debt  buildups,  particularly  if 
governments try to mitigate servicing costs by 
5 It is important to note that post-crises increases in pub-
lic debt do not necessarily push economies into the vulner-
able 90+ debt/GDP range.
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Figure 3. External Debt, Growth, and Inflation: 
Selected Emerging Markets, 1970-2009
Notes:  The  20  emerging  market  countries  included  are 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Egypt, 
India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, 
Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela. The number of observations for the four debt 
groups are: 252 for debt/GDP below 30 percent; 309 for 
debt/GDP 30 to 60 percent; 120 observations for debt/GDP 
60 to 90 percent; and 74 for debt/GDP above 90 percent. 
There is a total of 755 annual observations.
Sources: International Monetary Fund,  world Economic 
Outlook, World Bank, Global Development finance, and 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009b) and sources cited therein.MAY 2010 578 AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS
shortening the maturing structure of debt. As 
Reinhart  and  Rogoff  (2009b)  emphasize  and 
numerous models suggest, countries that choose 
to rely excessively on short-term borrowing to 
fund growing debt levels are particularly vul-
nerable to crises in confidence that can provoke 
very sudden and “unexpected” financial crises. 
At the very minimum, this would suggest that 
traditional debt management issues should be at 
the forefront of public policy concerns.
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